attempted to cover this general ground, and reference will be made throughout to Taylor (1997) and to Fornas (1995) . This article is not set up in opposition to them, but rather in opposition to two key features in the discourse of authenticity.
As suggested above, discussions of the attribution of authenticity cannot always take place with explicit reference to matters of sonic design. I start, therefore, from an assumption that authenticity does not inhere in any combination of musical sounds. 'Authenticity' is a matter of interpretation which is made and fought for from within a cultural and, thus, historicised position. It is ascribed, not inscribed.
As Sarah Rubidge has it: 'authenticity is... not a property of, but something we ascribe to a performance' (Rubidge 1996, p. 219) . Whether a performance is authentic, then, depends on who 'we' are. However, if this quality that we call 'authenticity' does not inhere in the music we hear, where does it lie? It is my second assumption in this article that it is a construction made on the act of listening. In part, I take this tack to accommodate my own doubts about the positing of both a unified and a fragmented subject. However, it seems to me that far from resolving such doubts before advancing positions on authenticity, theorisation of observations made on how things count as authentic will in turn inform the question of how such observers constitute their subjectivity.
Thus, rather than ask what (piece of music, or activity) is being authenticated, in this article I ask who. I also recognise that, even in my proposal of a globalising perspective, my own exploration is undertaken from within a bounded cultural position. Michael Pickering is alive to this difficulty when he argues that "'authenticity" is a relative concept which is generally used in absolutist terms' (Pickering 1986 , p. 213), while Fornas argues that a 'realist' approach to the question is far too limiting in aesthetic discourses. I trust that my own subjectivity will be understood in reference to the examples I shall employ in what follows.
The issue of what can be understood as 'authentic' is not exclusive to popular music discourse. It is, of course, pertinent to the hallowed distinctions between 'pop' and 'rock' on the one hand, and to the less hallowed (because more recent) distinctions between dance music genres on the other (for instance, the necessity of 'hardcore' in relation to commercialised raves in the late 1980s). It is pertinent to debates within the 'folk' music tradition and, indeed, this understanding has historical priority. It is even pertinent to contemporary approaches to the performance of music in the Euro-American formal music tradition (Kenyon 1988 is an authoritative text), although discussion of this aspect is well outside the scope of this article. Judging from recent critical writing, one may think it has become less pertinent. Born and Hesmondhalgh have recently pointed out that the concept 'has been consigned to the intellectual dust-heap' (Born and Hesmondhalgh 2000, p. 30) since, in a postmodern world where appropriation (of material by producers of music) is everywhere evident, it no longer carries its originary force. However, there seem to me three particular reasons why such an abandonment is premature, the first two of which I develop. The first is that to identify the authentic with the original is only one understanding which is currently made, an understanding which should not be allowed to annexe the whole. The second is that in one sense, appropriation (of sonic experiences by perceivers) remains foundational to processes of authentication. The third is that the social alienation produced under modernity, which appears to me the ideological root of such striving for the authentic, and of which we have been aware for decades, gromrs daily more apparent.4
In rock discourse, the term has frequently been used to define a style of writing or performing, particularly anything associated with the practices of the singer/ songwriter, where attributes of intimacy (just Joni Mitchell and her zither)5 and immediacy (in the sense of unmediated forms of sound production) tend to connote authenticity. It is used in a socio-economic sense, to refer to the social standing of the musician. It is used to determine the supposed reasons she has for working, whether her primary felt responsibility is to herself, her art, her public, or her bank balance. It is used to bestow integrity, or its lack, on a performer, such that an 'authentic' performer exhibits realism, lack of pretence, or the like. Note that these usages do not mutually exclude one another, nor do they necessarily coincide, and that all are applied from the outside. Lawrence Grossberg (1992) has argued that the distinction between 'authentic' and its opposite ('entertainment' at some times, 'commercial' at others) underpins the history of popular music from the time of Elvis Presley onwards, and that such a history proceeds as a pendulum, swinging from one extreme to the other, frequently with much disagreement among fans and critics as to which term to apply to which music -again, such attributions are to be fought for. Roy Shuker takes this historicisation further, declaring 'that using authenticity to distinguish between rock and pop is no longer valid, though it continues to serve an important ideological function' (Shuker 1994, p. 8). In each of these accounts, there is a sense in which different understandings of authenticity are conflated in the presence of this fundamental authentic/commercial paradigm, a view supported in Shuker's later discussion (Shuker 1998 ). In what follows, I attempt to bypass this conflation such that these different understandings become more accessible.
First person authenticity
In terms of music, it seems that debates over authenticity can best begin from the 'folk'. In praising the institution of the English folk song revival at the beginning of the last century, the composer Hubert Parry noted that folk songs had 'no sham, no got-up glitter, and no vulgarity' (quoted in Boyes 1993, p. 26). In these terms, he opposed (authentic) folk song to (commercial) music hall, thereby making plain both his, and the revivalists', disdain for the music of the urban working-class. Parry's was a voice to be listened to. A related example can be found in the case of much of the punk movement of the 1970s. In its direct opposition to the growth of disco, it was read as an authentic expression (Laing 1985, pp. 1>17; Garofalo 1987, pp. 89-90). Here, authenticity is assured by 'reflecting back' to an earlier authentic practice. Bruce Johnson, however, points to the limited adequacy of such a procedure, and perhaps to the observation that it is found much more in music intended for established circuits: 'especially in vernacular music, so often generated in the moment of performance, kinaesthetics rather than artistic logic is often the key to why music sounds the way it does' (Johnson 1997, p. 13).
The expression I am discussing here is perceived to be authentic because it is unmediated -because the distance between its (mental) origin and its (physical) manifestation is wilfully compressed to nil by those with a motive for so perceiving it. This is thus one basic form of the authenticity as primality argument put forward by Taylor In its incredulity towards subjective autonomy, postmodernism may seem incompatible with authenticity. Redhead (1990) 'So hard' exemplifies this, with its matter-of-fact tone where everything seems to be kept rigidly under control (to prevent felt emotions from escaping) in singing lyrics which purport to tell a true story.l° The listener desiring to make such an interpretation is probably not, however, one who would listen to Paul Weller in the way discussed above. Theodore Gracyk finds the concept of rock authenticity bound up with rock's association with the project of liberalism (citing in particular U2), founded as it is on the identification of a pre-existent subjectivity (Gracyk 1996, pp. 221-3). As such, he argues against Grossberg's view that authenticity has become increasingly irrelevant in the face of postmodernism, in the process equating authenticity to self-expression (Gracyk 1996, pp. 22>5).
What unites all these understandings of authenticity is their vector, the physical direction in which they lead. They all relate to an interpretation of the perceived expression of an individual on the part of an audience. Particular acts and sonic gestures (of various kinds) made by particular artists are interpreted by an engaged audience as investing authenticity in those acts and gestures -the audience becomes engaged not with the acts and gestures themselves, but directly with the originator of those acts and gestures. This results in the first pole of my perspective: authenficity of expression, or what I also term 'first person authenticity', arises when an originator (composer, performer) succeeds in conveying the impression that his/ her utterance is one of integrity, that it represents an attempt to communicate in an unmediated form with an audience.
The presence of this conceptualisation of authenticity is undeniable. Two problems attach themselves to it. The first is the extent to which it is itself trustworthy, or whether it is mere illusion, which I have raised in the introduction and will return to. The second is that, in tending to conceive authenticity as inherent rather than attributed, this conceptualisation tends to mask two others, equally valid, to which I now turn.
Third person authenticity
The very naivety of such a perception, of taking on trust the unmediated utterance, is embedded in Fornas' generalisation of Grossberg's typology of authenticity. Grossberg argues for three genre-specific authenticities, that of rock (founded in the romanticised ideology of the community, cf. Paul Weller above), of black genres (founded on the rhythmicised and sexual body), and that of self-conscious postmodernity (showing honesty in the acceptance of cynical self-knowledge, cf. the Pet Shop Boys above). Fornas generalises these to produce social authenticity, subjective authenticity and meta-authenticity, each of which has both conservative and progressive variants (Fornas 1995, pp. 276-7) . Thus, 'social authenticity' is ensured in an act of judgement legitimate within a particular community, while 'subjective authenticity' is validated by the individual. 'Cultural or meta-authenticity' is a more recent development, validating 'synthetic' texts through the evidenced meta-reflexivity of their authors (as discussed above by Redhead). The third of these is particularly marked as an authentication of the author, although this aspect is also strong in Fornas' first two categories. Moreover, Fornas argues that authenticity is not directly opposed to artificiality since authenticity is, after all, necessarily a construction we place upon what we perceive (Fornas 1995, p. 275) . Such a construction is perhaps more obvious in the blues rock movement than in those cases considered above.
The blues rock movement of the 1960s was partly founded on the employment of a style ('the blues') which, in its origins in the racist and economically deprived Mississippi delta, was felt to embody such a harsh reality that the reality became embodied in the style itself. Thus, it became a matter of ideology that to employ the 'blues' within a thoroughly different social context, by venerating its originators thereby enabled the appropriation of their very authenticity. This is exemplified by the early work of Eric Clapton. Green, and to a lesser extent for guitarists like Jeff Beck and Jimmy Page, the search for the musical soul of blues singers like Robert Johnson was propelled by a desire to appropriate the 'unmediated expression' which was thought to be the preserve of the country blues style, entailing an unquestioned assumption that African Americans in the southern USA were somehow more 'natural' beings than white, college-educated Londoners. The observation that such an appropriation is commonly considered normative is dramatically conveyed by its treatment in Brunning (1986); a hagiographic narrative is constructed whereby a host of musicians discover this blessed 'other' music, and by rendering such a move unproblematic, it becomes 'natural' (in the Adornian sense).
The importance of retaining a point of origin is also exemplified in Paul Gilroy's conceptualisation of the equation for black listeners of local ('original') expressions of culture with authenticity, and more global manifestations with cultural dilution (or lack of aesthetic value: Gilroy 1993, p. 96). This is therefore a separate manifestation of the authenticity as primality argument, since it is the tracing back to an original which validates the contemporary. Middleton's conception of the construction of authenticity is useful here. He argues that this conceptualisation builds a refuge of meaning within the bourgeois romantic critique of industrial society. And yet, within this manoeuvre, there do hide real processes -he focuses on what he calls 'continuity' and 'active use' (which combine as 'tradition') and which suggest that 'from the debris of "authenticity"' (Middleton 1990, p. 139), we may rescue the notion of 'appropriation'. And, as he argues following Janos Marothy, such a move is universally available; it is not tied to any particular stylistic formulations.
By appropriating, by exhibiting trust in and making available to a broader audience, the patterns of performance exemplified by black blues artists, Clapton (whose own authority was underlined by the familiar 'Clapton is God' graffito) authenticates them. Two points are worth making here. First, it is no great distance from this 'appropriation' to the actual invention of a tradition in order to authenticate contemporary practices.l2 David Harvey notes that this is no new endeavour: the ideological labour of inventing tradition kecame of great significance in the late nineteenth century precisely because this was an era when transformations in spatial and temporal practices implied a loss of identity with place and repeated radical breaks with any sense of historical continuity. (Harvey 1990, p. 272) Second, there is an important link to first person authenticity. According to Grossberg, the authentic rock singer requires '[the] ability to articulate private but common desires, feelings and experiences into a shared public language. It demands that the performer have a real relation to his or her audience' (Grossberg 1992, p. 207) in terms of shared, or at least analogous, experiences. The music needs both to transcend that experience in some way (in order to be presented as an idealised, i.e. artistic statement, rather than through everyday conversation), but also to authenticate it by expressing it in a way particular to that singer. ). There seem no intrinsic reasons why such a song needs to be performed in this way -all that can be said is that the interpolations cushion the steady monotony of the regular rhythm of the lyric.14 Its force can be recognised by its appearance in John Lennon's 'Working-Class Hero' (1970), where the metre remains rigidly 3+4. In this song, Lennon appears to have wanted to convey an intensity, an utter lack of pretension, and an integrity to the experience he relates, making it clear that it is his own experience. The device, however, suggests that he is building on the harsh reality of the traditional singer, in an analogous way to Clapton's employment of the blues.
The current popularity of the 'tribute' band provides another, markedly different, example. There is no single ethos which underlies the activities of this mass of everyday musicians, but that of faithful reproduction in order to recover the reality of originary performances can be widely found. Thus, the Portsmouth-based Silver Beatles are lauded because they 'purvey a far more natural feel to their performance' -Cynthia Lennon is reported as claiming that they 'look alike, sound alike and even think alike' (Silver Beatles n. ReGenesis n.d.) . Note that for ReGenesis (and for their fans) it is the song which has an identity, which is the key to the experience. The parallel with one tradition of European concert practice, whereby contemporary performers attempt to re-create for contemporary ears the aural experience of earlier performances, via the re-creation of earlier instruments, is blatant.
Robert Walser (1993) insists that the most plausible identification of authenticity in heavy metal (an association which is perhaps infrequently made) is in terms of the Romantic vision of the artist as hero, an identification which is frequently overplayed, and thus, compromised, by the phenomenon of heavy metal as visual spectacle. This vision of the explorer returning with a more authentic form of expression, explored here and with reference to blues rock above, is also employed by Taylor 
Second person authenticity
While the question of why particular (groups of) listeners give value to some musical experiences above others may depend on what music connotes or denotes, it also depends on how the musical experience is constructed around a basic distinction which may be summarised as mainstream/margin, centre/ periphery, or coopted/underground. The burning question is one of belonging and, while this has been theorised in terms of subcultural theory (from Hall and Jefferson 1976 through to Thornton 1995 and beyond), a more useful source here is Green's (1988) theorisation of how music's inherent meanings affirm or aggravate us, as we feel positively or negatively towards a particular style's delineations, and as we are not necessarily united by more than music. The basic distinction most relevant at this point is that which originated in the mid-1960s between a popular music centre ('pop') and periphery ('rock'), concerning as it did the nature of the commercial enterprise surrounding examples of each particular style: the degree to which it could be perceived as 'authentic'. Dispassionately speaking, of course, this commercial/authentic polarity is illusory, since all mass-mediated music is subject to commercial imperatives, but what matters to listeners is whether such subjection appears to be accepted, resisted, or negotiated with, by those to whom they are listening. Robert Walser identifies this as the second of his two identifications of rock authenticity, one upheld by critics who have equated commercial mediation with ideological compromise, and who have thus decried the reliance on recording contracts with major record companies and the ensuing big distribution deals.
In Grossberg's analysis, the growth in the 1950s of new structures of technological, economic, and social practices tended to deny many (most particularly working-class, adolescent males) access to the heady, future-oriented, post-war social enterprise. This rejection engendered an alienation which was nurtured by a spirit of optimistic liberalism which in turn repressed social and cultural differ-ences, and which was articulated by the emergence of the lascivious hips, the narcissistic gaze, and the analgesic beat of rock'n'roll. Grossberg identifies this as a key moment: the 'authenticity' which its fans found in this music was defined not by its anchorage in the past, nor by the integrity of its performers, but by its ability to articulate for its listeners a place of belonging, an ability which distinguished it from other cultural forms, particularly those which promised 'mere entertainment' (in which they invested nothing more than cash), or those belonging to hegemonic groupings (in which they could not invest). Moore (1998a) follows Allan (1986) in defining this 'place of belonging' as a 'centredness', calling attention to the experience that this cultural product offered an affirmation, a cultural identity in the face of accelerating social change, in large part because it itself had no history apparent to its participants. This 'centredness' implies an active lifting of oneself from an unstable experiential ground and depositing oneself within an experience to be trusted, an experience which centres the listener. The opposition to a post-modern characterisation of 'de-centred' experience is here intentional.
We A second example comes from a more unlikely source. In her discussion of dance culture, Sarah Thornton describes the process whereby enculturation naturalises technologies. She argues that authenticity inheres in a musical form15 at the point at which that form is essential to a particular subculture (Thornton 1995, p. 29). Part of her argument traces the reorientation of reception from live performances to records, this latter medium acquiring its own authenticity: the authentication of discs for dancing was dependent on the development of new kinds of event and environment, which recast recorded entertainment as something uniquely its own, rather than a poor substitute for a 'real' musical event. (Thornton 1995, p. 51) This process of enculturation which develops authentication over a period of generations thus has material foundations, but it is nonetheless in these that its listeners authenticate themselves. The artificiality of the medium is also no bar for Fornas: 'A seemingly artificial text may also be an authentic expression of true life experiences in an artificial society' (Fornas 1995 So, in acknowledging that authenticity is ascribed to, rather than inscribed in, a performance, it is beneficial to ask who, rather than what, is being authenticated by that performance. Three types of response are possible, according to whether it is the performer herself, the performer's audience, or an (absent) other who is being authenticated. Siting authenticity within the ascription carries the corollary that every music, and every example, can conceivably be found authentic by a particular group of perceivers and that it is the success with which a particular performance conveys its impression that counts, a success which depends in some part on the explicitly musical decisions performers make. Whether such perceivers are necessarily fooled by doing so is, perhaps, beside the point since we may learn as much from creative misunderstanding as from understanding. Although I believe it outside the scope of what I have attempted here to theorise either the rehabilitation of an 'authentic subject' or processes of the construction of subjectivity, it seems to me that the evidence arrayed above far more easily supports the latter position. Academic consideration of authenticity should thus, I believe, shift from consideration of the intention of various originators towards the activities of various perceivers, and should focus on the reasons they might have for finding, or failing to find, a particular performance authentic. 
